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This paper reports the results of a research project which involves the
collection and organization of income account and balance sheet data, at
the individual firm level, for the years 1926-77. The primary data source
for the study is Moody's Industrial Manual.
By working at the level of the individual firm, it is possible to obtain
more accurate information on the market values of traded securities and
more detailed information on the structure of firms' balance sheets than is
typically available at the aggregate level. Accurate data on the income
accounts and balance sheets of firms over a substantial period of time can
provide researchers with a rich source of information against which
specific hypotheses regarding corporate financing and investment deci-
sions can be tested. The data collected for this study, and software
necessary to manage them efficiently, are available from the authors in
either IBM or VAX formats at a nominal fee. An NBER Technical Pa-
per is also available which describes the dataset and software in detail.
Section 2.1 briefly describes the manner in which the data were col-
lected and organized. A more detailed presentation of the characteristics
of the dataset and accompanying computer software can be found in the
Appendix. Section 2.2 considers the aggregate characteristics of the
sample. In particular, firm average data on the sources and uses of funds,
market valuations, and rates of return are presented for the 1926-77
period. Section 2.3 reports on the results of utilizing some firm-level data
to estimate a simple portfolio model which attempts to explain changes in
balance sheet flows.
John H. Ciccolo, Jr., is an economist with the Capital Market Group at Citibank
Corporation and a research affiliate of the NBER. Christopher F. Baum is associate
professor of economics at Boston College.
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2.1 Collection and Organization of the Data
Our primary goal in this research project was to construct a micro
dataset covering a substantial period of time for use in testing specific
hypotheses regarding firm financing and investment decisions and the
financial markets' valuations of these activities. A secondary goal was to
organize and present the data in a manner that would allow other re-
searchers conveniently to access, verify, and extend the basic dataset. To
that end, the project also involved the creation of computer software to
provide easy access to and retrieval of the data.
The sample of firms for the period 1926-77 is actually composed of
nine separate subsamples, drawn periodically from various issues of
Moody's Industrial Manual. The composition of these subsamples is
outlined in table 2.1. The goal was to obtain nine overlapping subsamples
of 50 subject firms each. Subject to restrictions on fiscal year, degree of
consolidation, decipherability of complex transactions, and natural re-
source intensiveness, 52 firms were initially selected using a set of random
numbers spanning the number of pages in each Moody's edition. Refer-
ring to table 2.1,28 firms in subsamples 1-7 were deleted ex post because
closer examination revealed inconsistencies with the initial selection
criteria. For subsamples 8 and 9, only 77 of the 104 firms initially selected
survived, due primarily to changes in accounting policies (typically result-
ing from acquisitions) which could not be reconciled without resort to
additional data sources such as annual reports or form 10-K's.
For each firm in a subsample, the values for 52 data items are recorded
annually. These items are listed and described in the Appendix. About
thirty of the data items can be transcribed directly from the income
account and balance sheet tables of the Moody's volume corresponding
to the subsample (see the third column of table 2.1). For most of the



























































7 (1971-77)83 Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
information provided in Moody's and to employ issues of the Manual
from several years of the subsample. For instance, multiple issues of the
Manual were necessarily referenced when firms retired a debt or pre-
ferred stock issue during the subsample interval. In cases where informa-
tion on the outstanding amounts of individual debt issues for particular
years were missing, the sinking fund terms were used to interpolate for
the missing values.
The replacement value figures reported for firms' inventories (data
item 45) are generally available for the firms of subsample 9 from foot-
notes in Moody's for the years 1976 and 1977. Also, a substantial fraction
of firms increased the amount of inventories carried on a LIFO basis in
1974 and also reported the replacement values. To fill in data for missing
years, 20 industry-level price indices were used to construct estimates in
the manner suggested by Lindenberg and Ross (1981). For subsamples 7
and 8, book values of inventories were converted to replacement values
using indices for the aggregate manufacturing sector. For all subsamples,
book values of plant and equipment were converted to replacement
values using Census Bureau deflators for the manufacturing sector. One
way in which the quality of these data clearly could be improved would be
to gather replacement values from form 10-K's for recent years and use
industry deflators computed by other researchers for earlier years. The
existing software would allow these new deflators to be integrated easily
into the main body of data.
2.2 Aggregate Characteristics of the Sample
Several aspects of the recent performance of U.S. nonfinancial cor-
porations have attracted widespread attention. Since the mid-1960s there
has been a dramatic decline in the securities markets' valuations of these
firms relative to the replacement costs of their assets and also relative to
the returns generated by these assets (Brainard et al. 1980; Feldstein
1980). At the same time, nonfinancial corporate businesses have become
more reliant on debt securities in financing their growth (Friedman 1980,
pp. 21-26). The inflationary environment of the past 15 years has pro-
vided a powerful incentive for those with taxable incomes to increase
their indebtedness. Additionally, as Friedman (1980) points out, the
postwar trend away from internal sources of funds toward debt financing
represents, at least partially, an adjustment toward more normal pre-
Depression debt levels.
To place these issues in perspective, this section documents the sources
and uses of funds, market valuations, and rates of return for the 1926-77
period using our sample of manufacturing firms. To present the general
characteristics of the sample, a substantial amount of aggregation is
performed. The balance sheets of the sample firms are consolidated as84 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum















described in table 2.2. For each firm, variables of interest—such as new
debt or equity issues—are measured relative to net assets. Then firm data
are averaged for each year to provide a time series for a hypothetical firm
with the mean characteristics of its subsample. Table 2.3 shows the results
of performing such calculations on the components of net assets for the
overlapping years of the subsamples, as well as the years 1926-27 and the
years 1976-77.
An interesting feature of the results presented in table 2.3 is the rather
dramatic decline in the cash items variable, which is composed primarily
of cash and short-term marketable securities. Considered in conjunction
with the recent increase in the role of debt in corporate capital structures,
the decline is even more striking. Closer inspection reveals that, at least
since the mid-1960s, the fall in the share of cash items in net assets has
























































































Note: Column entries are percentages of net assets. Rows may not sum to 100% because of
rounding.85 Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
drastic increase in current liabilities in 1941 was due primarily to in-
creased corporate taxation.
2.2.1 Sources and Uses of Funds
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relative importance of internal and external
funds in financing the "average" firm, while figure 2.2 depicts the role of
debt among external sources of finance. In both figures, the large spikes
appearing above the years 1937, 1941, 1947, 1951, 1956, and 1974 coin-
= Additions to retained earnings
• • Additions to retained earnings plus net new issues of securities -5-
1930 1935 1941 1947 1953 1959 1965 1971
Fig. 2.1 Sources of funds as a percentage of net assets, 1927-77'.
1930 1935 1941 1947 1953 1959 1965 1971
Fig. 2.2 Sources of external funds as a percentage of net assets,
1927-77.86 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
cide with periods of unusual inventory accumulation and apparently
represent a demand for external funds to finance unplanned inventories.
However, this is not true for the broad spike that appears above the years
1965-68. During this period there was an unusually large demand for
funds for capital expenditures and for takeovers.
1
To highlight the longer-run trends, data on sources and uses of funds
have been averaged over the individual years of the subsamples, and the
results are presented in table 2.4. According to these results, net issues of
debt securities remained quite constant from the 1936-41 period through
the mid-1960s, when a large shift toward external sources of funds oc-
curred. In fact, the percentage of total sources accounted for by net debt
issues since 1965 is about 20, slightly more than double that in the
pre-1965 period. The results of table 2.4 also clearly illustrate the in-
creased demand for funds to finance nonfinancial activities that has




















































































































































































aBoth preferred and common shares.87 Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
accounted for by increased expenditures on physical assets. The gradual
trend toward external (relative to internal) sources of funds during the
earlier postwar years reflects primarily a decline in undistributed profits
relative to net assets.
Several features of the 1927-30 and 1931-35 periods require comment.
First, during 1927-30 there were virtually no retirements of common
stock, and the -0.8 figure under stock retirements is due solely to
retirements of preferred stock. Net issues of common equity were negligi-
ble except for the years 1928 and 1929. Furthermore, the plant/equip-
ment data for the years prior to 1935 were estimated as depreciation
allowances plus the change in net property account and are thus not
comparable with the figures presented for later years. This latter feature
accounts for the relatively large discrepancy between total uses and total
sources for 1927-30. Also, the relatively low figure for undistributed
profits for the 1927-30 period, 2.8% of net assets, is not indicative of low
profitability, as 70% of funds available for common stock were paid out
as dividends during this period.
2.2.2 Market Valuations
Securities markets provide a continuing valuation of corporations and
their earnings streams and therefore, indirectly of their net assets. The
ratio of market value, as determined in financial markets, to the replace-
ment value of tangible assets has been dubbed Tobin's q, and this section
investigates how q has behaved over the 1926-77 period.
Figure 2.3 plots q for the average firm in each of the nine overlapping
2.0-•
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Fig. 2.3 Market value of securities, relative to net assets, 1926-77.88 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
subsamples and also indicates the composition of the ratio as between
debt, equity, and preferred stock components. For instance, the distance
between the horizontal axis and the first broken line represents the
market valuation of debt securities relative to net assets. To assist in
interpreting the figure, table 2.5 provides the average values for the
overlapping years of the subsamples, as well as for 1926-27 and 1976-77.
2
A complete listing of the data used to construct figure 2.3 appears as
table 2.6.
Both table 2.5 and figure 2.3 clearly indicate the increasing importance
of debt in the capital structure of the "average" corporation. It is some-
what surprising that the sum of debt and preferred stock, relative to net
assets, has remained virtually constant over the entire 50-year period,
suggesting that the increase in debt has come primarily at the expense of
preferred stock. Another feature of figure 2.3 that clearly stands out is the
sharp fall and subsequent rapid recovery of the common equity compo-
nent of the ratio during the 1930-34 period. This is even more dramatic
when one considers that capital goods prices were falling and thus reduc-
ing net assets and moving the ratio in the opposite direction. The figure
also shows plainly the substantial decline of equity values that began in
1968. This slide in the ratio of the market value of equity relative to net
assets is steeper and more prolonged than any previous decline illustrated
in the diagram.
Because of significant sampling differences between the subsamples,
figure 2.3 has several substantial jumps which hinder interpretation. This
is especially true for the most recent years. Figure 2.4 and table 2.7
present data on q for the period 1965-77 which have been spliced to
eliminate the discrete jump for 1971. The numbers for the period 1965-71








































































































































































































































































































































































































the 1971 values of the 1971-77 subsample. These adjusted results indicate
that the ratio of the market value of debt to the replacement value of net
assets increased moderately over the 1965-77 period.
Finally, this spliced series on q is compared, in table 2.8, with alterna-
tive estimates reported in the literature.
2.2.3 Rates of Return
This subsection presents calculations of several measures of the returns






q and components, 1965-77.
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return on common stockholders' equity with the total rate of return on
net assets, both rates of return measured on a replacement-cost basis. In
computing both rates, an adjustment is made to place depreciation
charges on a replacement-cost basis. Stockholders' equity is defined as
net assets (replacement) minus the market values of debt and preferred




























































































































































Sources: Ciccolo-Baum: Calculations by the authors based on a sample of firms from the
PANEL database; Brainard-Shoven-Weiss: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2
(1980): 466; Economic Report of the President: January 1979, table 30, p. 128; Lindenberg-






= Rate of return on stockholders' equity
=Rate of return on net assets
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Fig. 2.5 Net rates of return, 1927-77.
stock; analogous calculations using book values yield similar figures. An
inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) was not included in the figure 2.5
data because the database at present does not contain the information
necessary to compute IVA prior to 1960. However, an IVA is presented
in table 2.9, which compares various rates of return for the 1961-70 and
1971-77 periods. Coupled with the information presented in figure 2.3
and table 2.5, these results confirm the significant decline which has
recently occurred in the securities markets' valuation of assets relative to
the returns generated by those assets. When we consider the differences
in sampling procedures, the rates of return (inclusive of IVA) presented
in this study are close to those reported by Brainard et al. (1980, table 1,
p. 463). Their estimates for the rate of return on net assets are 7.8% and
6.9% for the 1961-70 and 1971-77 periods, respectively, compared with
the estimates of 8.7% and 7.5% presented in table 2.9.
The rates of return reported in table 2.9 ignore the effects of both
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assets and liabilities. In particular, the component of the rate of return on
net assets which reflects the tax deductibility of the inflation premium
contained in nominal interest rates is not included in the calculations.
Also, no allowance is made for the distributional effects of realized
inflation versus anticipated inflation between creditors and stockholders.
However, because the difference between paper assets and paper liabili-
ties, relative to total net assets, is only + 0.02 for 1961-70 and - 0.055 for
1971-77, one would expect these effects to be small.
2.2.4 Conclusion
This section has presented some of the aggregate characteristics of the
sample of manufacturing firms for the years 1926-77. The results, as
regards the postwar period, are broadly consistent with those obtained by
other researchers. That is, the data illustrate the increasing importance of
external financing—particularly debt—as a source of funds for firms' real
investment expenditures. The results also illustrate the dramatic decline
that has occurred in the past 15 years in the securities markets' valuation
of net assets relative to replacement values, and also relative to rates of
return.
2.3 Balance Sheet Flows, 1966-77 and 1927-35
This section of the paper presents a simple portfolio model explaining
the responses of nine balance sheet items to changes in firms' net cash
flow, defined as additions to retained earnings plus depreciation allow-
ances, and Tobin's q. The idea underlying the model is that firms face
different constraints, and behave differently, when attempting to in-
crease their stock of physical capital than when trying to reduce it. The
framework for the investment model is the familiar flexible accelerator
model of investment behavior which relates investment to the discrep-
ancy between a desired and actual capital stock.
In the special case where the elasticity of the marginal product of
capital with respect to the desired stock is unity, the market value of the
existing capital stock provides an estimate of the desired stock. This is the
rationale for relating the ratio of fixed investment to capital stock to
Tobin's q. However, fixed investment expenditures represent only one
use of a firm's resources, and thus only one part of the portfolio decision.
The flows of other assets and liabilities must be considered simultane-
ously, if for no other reason than that the investment expenditures must
be financed. The approach taken here is that firms simultaneously deter-
mine all asset and liability flows given a desired firm size—as represented
by q—and given their cash flow, which is assumed exogenous to the
portfolio decision.
The final feature to be incorporated into the model is an allowance for94 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
asymmetric behavior in expansionary and contractionary regimes. For
the simplest case of a firm for which the speed of capital accumulation is
limited by variable adjustment costs and for which decumulation is
limited by the rate of physical depreciation, the structural parameters of
the investment function would reflect the adjustment costs when net
investment is positive and would be zero otherwise. Again, if there is an
asymmetric response of investment to changes in the independent vari-
ables depending on whether further investment is profitable or not, then
there must be an asymmetric response in at least one other balance sheet
flow. To estimate such a model, then, it is necessary to classify firm
observations into these two regimes. An effective way to jointly classify
the observations and estimate the model's parameters is by means of a
switching regression (Day 1969). We now outline this procedure.
For the two-variable case, the estimation procedure can be described
as follows. Given T observations on a dependent variable yt and an
independent variable xt, we desire to estimate for each observation the
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probability of yt; then/?, = pr (/, .yf)/pr (yt), the conditional probability of
Regime I given yt.
To obtain the empirical results presented below, a switching regression
relating investment to q and net cash flow is estimated iterating on the
four first-order conditions as described by Kiefer (1980). Given these
estimated parameters, the pt are computed and used to weight the
observations in the regressions which explain changes in other balance
sheet items.
2.3.1 Data
To apply the procedure outlined above, data from the first two panels,
1931 and 1936, and the last two panels, 1972 and 1978, were combined to
give 9 annual observations (1927-35) for the earlier period and 12 (1966-
77) for the later period. To make the data in two neighboring panels more
compatible, information on firms that overlap was used to adjust the
means of the nonoverlapping firms in each separate period. This is done
assuming, for each variable, that had a nonoverlapping firm been repre-
sented in both panels, its mean would have changed between panels in
the same way as for the average overlapping firm. For the earlier period
there are 12 overlapping firms, and 11 in the later period.
Tobin's q is adjusted and redefined for each firm as the ratio of
observed q to the mean value of q over the particular sample period. This
is done to correct for persistent deviations of q above unity due to the
capitalization of monopoly rents. The q variable enters the regressions
with a lag of 1 year, while the net cash flow variable enters contempo-
raneously. All variables are measured as deviations around firm means.
2.3.2 Balance Sheet Flow Definitions
The nine dependent variables of interest, measured in current period
prices, are
1. Investment: additions at cost.
2. Acash assets: A[total current assets minus inventories minus
accounts receivable].
3. Ainventories: A[FIFO inventories] minus capital gains (estimated
residually for 1927-35).
4. Anet accounts receivable: [accounts receivable minus accounts pay-
able].
5. Aother long-term assets: A[book value of plant and equipment
minus additions at cost plus excess of cost over book value of
acquisitions] (estimated residually for 1966-77).
6. Ashort-term debt: A[debt due in less than one year].
7. Along-term debt: long-term debt issues minus retirements.
8. Acommon equity: [equity issues minus equity retirements].
9. Aother short-term liabilities: A[total current liabilities minus
accounts payable].96 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
These variables are all measured relative to total net assets, lagged 1
period. Due to the balance sheet constraint, an unit increase in cash flow
will result in a unit increase in the difference between the sum of the asset
flows and the sum of the liability flows, whereas a unit increase in q will
leave this difference unchanged.
2.3.3 Results for 1966-77
The results of estimating the investment switching regression, comput-
ing the regime probabilities, and employing them in estimating equations
for the other eight balance sheet flow items for the 1966-77 period appear
in table 2.10. The estimate of the mixing parameter, X, is 0.302, which
indicates that about 30% of the observations are classified into Regime I
(expansion) and about 70% into Regime II (contraction). The parameter
estimates indicate substantial differences in balance sheet flows, resulting
from changes in both q and cash flow (CF), between regimes. With the
exception of net accounts receivable, the Regime I coefficients for q are
larger for all flow items than those for Regime II, and, with the exception
of cash assets, the same is true for the CF coefficients.
The Regime I results indicate that substantial portfolio reallocations
take place in response to increases in q and CF. On the asset side of the
balance sheet, the largest responses to changes in both q and CF are in
Table 2.10 Balance Sheet Flows Due to Unit Increase in q or Net Cash Flow
(CF) (Manufacturing Firms, 1966-77)
Assets
Flows q








































































Note: The difference between asset and liability column sums may not add to zero or one
due to rounding.97 Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
real assets: plant and equipment, inventories, and other long-term assets.
Recalling that other long-term assets primarily represent acquisitions, it
is not surprising that its q coefficient is larger than that reported for
investment expenditures. On the liability side, this increase in fixed assets
is accompanied primarily by increases in long-term debt and common
equity.
Contrary to prior expectations, cash flow is a more important variable
in classifying observations between regimes than q, the respective stan-
dard deviations of CF and q being 0.02 and 0.30.
Figures 2.6-2.9 plot the results of aggregating the variables of the
investment equation across firms, by regime, using the estimated clas-
sification probabilities as weights. That is, the labelp*q is 2*ipitqit. Given
the underlying model, the appropriate variables to include in equations
explaining aggregate balance sheet flow variables would be P*q, (1 -
P)*q, P*CF, and (1 - P)*CF. This procedure would account for the
changing distribution of firms by regime.
For example, it can be seen from figure 2.8 that while aggregate q was
falling during 1973, the proportion of firms classified into Regime I
increased dramatically, actually increasing P*q. This provides a possible
explanation for the fact that investment was increasing during a period
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Fig. 2.7 Investment/assets, 1966-77.98 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
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2.3.4 Results for 1927-35
The same set of regression equations was estimated for the years
1927-35, but for this earlier period the sample is split into durable-goods
and nondurable-goods firms. For the 1966-77 period the difference in
results due to this disaggregation was sufficiently minor to warrant pool-
ing the firms. For the earlier period, there are significant timing differ-
ences in the peaks and troughs of many of the variables. The 1927-35
results appear in table 2.11 (durables) and table 2.12 (nondurables).
Figures 2.10-2.17 plot the results of aggregating the variables of the
investment equation across firms, by regimes, using the estimated clas-
sification probabilities as weights.
For both durable and nondurable goods samples the observations are
about evenly divided between regimes. Qualitatively, the results for the
durable-goods sample are very similar to the results reported for 1966-
77, but quantitatively unit changes in q and CF do not induce such large
portfolio reallocations. This can be explained, at least in part, by firms'
greater reliance on internal sources of funds in the earlier period.
On the other hand, the results for the nondurable-goods sample indi-
cate that the data are inconsistent with our underlying model. While
there is some difference in the coefficient estimates across regimes, these99 Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
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Note: The difference between asset and liability column sums may not add to zero or one
due to rounding.
Table 2.12 Balance Sheet Flows Due to Unit Increase in q or Net Cash
(CF) (Nondurable-Goods Firms, 1927-35)
Assets
Flows q
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Note: The difference between asset and liability column sums may not add to zero or one
due to rounding.100 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
differences do not provide much discriminatory power because of rel-
atively large standard errors of estimate.
Examining the figures which plot the aggregate variables for the 1927-
35 period, one can see that the timing, at turning points, between our
independent variables and investment is not very supportive of the under-
lying model. Figures 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14 clearly show, for instance, that
investment started its long decline at least one year before q and CF.
Also, investment bottomed out in 1932, while q reached its minimum in
1933.
2.4 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has reported the results of a research project which involved
collecting and organizing income account and balance sheet data, at the
firm level, for the years 1926-77. Aggregate characteristics of the sample,
including sources and uses of funds, financial market valuations, and
rates of return, were presented and discussed. Another section of the
paper presented the results of estimating a simple portfolio model, ex-
plaining a number of balance sheet flows using the firm-level data.
The dataset should provide other researchers with a rich source of
information against which specific hypotheses regarding corporate
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Fig. 2.17b Regime II, cash flow/assets, nondurables.
Appendix
Description of the PANEL Data Set
The PANEL Data System provides income and balance sheet data on a
sample of manufacturing firms for the years 1926-77. The sample of firms
is actually composed of nine separate subsamples (panels) drawn periodi-
cally from various editions of Moody's Industrial Manual. The general
composition of the sample is outlined in table 2.1.
The goal was to obtain randomly drawn subsamples of size 50, but this
was not possible for all panels given our requirements regarding account-
ing procedures. These criteria involve fiscal year, degree of consolida-
tion, and, in the cases of firms purchasing other firms, accounting based
on a pooling of interest. Also, natural-resource-intensive firms are ex-
cluded.
The large quantity and several dimensions of these data necessitate a
second component of the PANEL Data System—an integrated set of
computer programs which enable the user to access the data in each of
several modes and manipulate it for research purposes.
This section of the Appendix describes the data available in each of the
nine panels. Section A.I describes the original, or raw, data and section
A.2 describes the transformations that are currently contained in the
PANEL Data System.
A.I Raw Data
Fifty-two items of raw data are available for each firm in each panel.
The first line is a firm header card giving the year of the panel (e.g., 1972),
an eight-letter firm identification code, the firm's name, a durable/non-
durable classification, the bond rating of the most recently issued debt
security, and the page number from Moody's from which the firm's data
was generated. The bond rating symbol NR indicates that the firm's debt
is unrated. An example of a header card from the 1954 panel of data is104 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum
PANEL 1954 BRISTOL-MYERS CO. [n A p. 1362.]
Following each header card, there are 51 lines of raw numerical data. For
instance, the line following the header card listed above is
01 55462,56611,61617,52266,42778,45308,44655.
Item 01 is sales and the data are in thousands of dollars, for years 1953,
1952,. . . , 1947. Thus, in 1953 Bristol-Myers had sales of $55,462,000. In
1947, sales were $44,655,000.
Section A.3 of the Appendix lists the variable symbols as they appear
on printed output, along with a brief description of each of the 52 data
items.
Most of the 52 raw data items listed are self-explanatory. However,
some of the data items require additional explanation, and this is done
below. Also, some of the data items are not available for each of the nine
panels. These exceptions are also discussed below.
Data Item 23, SPLIT V.
This variable records information on the stock splits and stock div-
idends. For a firm which splits its stock two for one, SPLIT V would equal
two. If the firm pays a 10% stock dividend, this V variable would take on
the value 1.10. The main use of SPLIT V is in allowing one to distinguish
between issues and retirements of common equity, on the one hand, and
splits and stock dividends on the other. Thus, this variable must be used
in computing new issues and retirements of equity.
Data Item 24, PF NONT.
PF NONT is the amount of preferred dividends associated with a firm's
nontraded preferred stock. To value nontraded preferred stock, PF
NONT is capitalized by a preferred dividend-price ratio which is user
supplied. Currently, the PANEL Data System contains a preferred div-
idend price ratio corresponding to Moody's "medium grade industrials."
Data Items 38 and 42.
These items give the coupon, maturity date, date of issue, date on
which sinking fund begins, amount authorized, and amount outstanding
for the traded debt issues number 1 and 2, respectively.
Data Item 45.
This data item gives an estimate of the replacement value of a firm's
inventories. The estimates in many cases are actually provided by the
firms themselves in footnotes to the Moody's tables. When the only
information available is the proportion of inventories in LIFO and the105 Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
length of time LIFO has been used, one of 20 available price indices is
used to estimate the replacement value of LIFO inventories. FIFO
inventories are assumed to equal replacement value.
Data Item 46.
This variable is the reported proportion of a firm's inventories that is
under the LIFO accounting method.
Data Item 47.
This is the price index associated with a firm's FIFO inventories. It is
used to compute an IVA. It is not necessarily the same price index that is
used in constructing a replacement estimate for the LIFO portion of
inventories.
Availability of Data Items.
All 52 data items are not available for all panels. Items 45-51 are
available only for the 1978 panel (years 1971-77). Item 19, additions at
cost, and item 1, sales, are not reported for the 1931 and 1936 panels.
Data item 1 for the 1931 and 1936 panels is replaced with the variable
"income taxes."
A.2 Variable Transformations
The PANEL Data System permits the user to define up to 76 variable
transformations. The current version of subroutine AGGREG contains
53 transformations. In performing transformations the user can introduce
external data via the data file AGGREG. Currently, a capital stock
deflator (DEFL), preferred stock dividend-price ratio (PDIV), inventory
deflator (PIN), and bond price index (BONDP) are present in the
AGGREG file. DEFL is used to convert firms' capital stock (data item
14), which is measured on a historical cost basis, to a replacement cost
basis; PIN serves a similar function for inventories. PDIV is the
(medium-grade industrial) preferred dividend-price ratio used to capital-
ize the dividends paid on the nontraded preferred stock. BONDP is a
bond price index.
The transformations currently programmed are listed in section 4 of
the Appendix.
The PANEL data system software provides access to the data, com-
putation of various averages, and regression of PANEL variables. The
PANEL software and data set is available from the authors in either an
IBM 370 or VAX 11/780 format for a nominal fee.106 John H. Ciccolo, Jr./Christopher F. Baum











































OPER INC Income from operations
TOT PFT Total income before interest and taxes
INT EXP Interest expense
DEPREC Depreciation (as reported in property acc'ts.)
NET INC Net income (avail, for pref/common
dividends)
PREF DIV Preferred dividends
COMM DIV Common dividends
MAINT Expenditures for Maintenance and repairs
ACC RECV Accounts receivable
INVENTRY Inventory, book value
TOT C.A. Total current assets
GROS PLT Gross property account, book value
NET PLT Net property account, book value
TOT ASST Total assets (excluding intangibles)
1YR LIAB Short-term debt and debt due in one year
ACC PAY Accounts payable
TOT C.L. Total current liabilities
ADD COST Additions at cost (gross P + E expenditures)
HI PRICE High price of common stock for year
LO PRICE Low price of common stock for year
NR COMMN Number of common shares at year end
SPLIT V Variable to adjust for stock splits, dividends
PF NONT Dividends on nontraded preferred stock
PFD 1 HI High price, first traded preferred stock issue
PFD 1 LO Low price, first traded preferred stock issue
NR PFD 1 Number of shares, first traded preferred issue
PFD 2 HI High price, second traded preferred issue
PFD 2 LO Low price, second traded preferred issue
NR PFD 2 Number of shares, second traded preferred
issue
CV NONT Nontraded convertible debt, book value
CV TRAD Traded convertible debt, book value
CV 1 HI High price of traded convertible debt
CV 1 LO Low price of traded convertible debt
DET 1 HI High price, first traded debt issue
DET 1 LO Low price, first traded debt issue
DET VAL Book value, first traded debt issue
: ITEM 38 (See text)
: DET 2 HI High price, second traded debt issue
: DET 2 LO Low price, second traded debt issue












ITEM 42 (See text)
NT LDEBT Book value, nontraded debt
TOT LTD Total book value of all long-term debt
ITEM 45 Inventory at replacement value
ITEM 46 Proportion of inventories in LIFO
ITEM 47 Price index for FIFO portion of inventories
ITEM 48 Deferred taxes
ITEM 49 Deferred compensation (incl. unfunded
pensions)
ITEM 50 Minority interest
ITEM 51 Other long-term liabilities
Durable Durable/nondurable indictor























































# 28 (Firmavg # 80)













































Value new pref. issues/TA
Cost retirements, pref./TA
Value new equity issues/TA
Cost retirements, equity/TA
Value new debt issues/TA
Cost retirements, debt/TA

























































































































































Change in cash assets/TA
Change in misc. assets/TA
Change in inventory/TA
Change in current liabs./TA




















1. Takeovers show up on the balance sheet in miscellaneous items as this variable
contains the difference between the actual cost of an acquisition and its book value.
Generally, acquisitions exceeding 10% of the purchasing firm's net assets disqualified the
firm from the sample.
2. Debt due in less than 1 year is valued at book. Nontraded long-term debt is valued
using a bond price index generated for each year for each subsample.
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Comment Franco Modigliani
In this paper, Ciccolo and Baum report on their endeavor to collect
income accounts and balance sheet data for a sample of industrial firms
over the span from 1926 to 1977. They also give a number of results based
on the analysis of these data. I will first comment briefly on their sampling
procedure and their method of estimating various components of the
balance sheet and of the income statement. The rest of my comments will
deal with section 2.2, in which they report information on the structure of
the balance sheet and its changes over the period, and on the composition
of the sources and uses of funds and its changes. I will focus particularly
on their discussion of the changing structure of the liability side.
The essence of Ciccolo and Baum's approach is to collect the basic data
for each firm with utmost care. But given limited resources, in order to
achieve this goal, they had to confine themselves to a rather modest
sample of firms. Their target was a sample of 52 firms, but some of the
firms had to be discarded for various reasons, and that left them with
samples mostly just below 50.
Given the smallness of the sample, one might have expected that
Ciccolo and Baum would have tried to oversample large firms—for
instance, by sampling dollar of sales or dollar of assets, rather than firms.
However, one gathers that in effect they sampled pages of Moody's. This
procedure would give, presumably, more chance to larger firms to appear
in the sample, but only to the extent that larger firms usually occupy more
space in Moody's. On the whole, one has a feeling that their sample may
be somewhat thin in the sense of being subject to significant sampling
fluctuations.
Ciccolo and Baum's sampling design makes it possible to throw some
light on this conjecture. In fact, their procedure consists in changing the
Franco Modigliani is Institute Professor and professor of economics and finance at the
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sample of firms every 5 years, but with 1-year overlap. For instance, the
first sample covers the years 1926-30, while the second covers the years
1930-35. Thus, for the year 1930, for 1935, and for every seventh year
thereafter, we have information available from two different samples. In
figure 2.3, one can compare some statistics for the outgoing and incoming
samples. The top graph exhibits the ratio of the market value of all
securities to the value of net of assets, at reproduction cost (basically,
Tobin's q). In the two lower graphs, the numerator of the ratio is,
respectively, debt plus preferred stock and debt only. It is apparent that
there are nonnegligible differences in the value of these ratios at points of
overlap. This fact raises some questions about the reliability of the
statistics computed from the sample and creates further problems on
appropriate methods of "splicing" the various samples. The authors seem
generally to handle this problem by using, for every year of overlap, the
mean of the two samples. Unfortunately, this procedure is very question-
able, and possibly very misleading, raising serious problems in the inter-
pretation of the results, as I shall point out shortly.
In table 2.2, the authors analyze the structure of the assets for the years
of overlap (where the sample is roughly twice as large as in other years),
plus the end points. I would like to remark on the classification of assets
and liabilities in the table. Specifically, I have some qualms about the
treatment of net current liabilities (except short-term debts) as a deduc-
tion from assets (a negative use) rather than as a source of funds. This
practice is appealing in the sense that it leaves, on the sources side, only
market instruments: debt, preferred stock, and equity. However, this
procedure does tend to produce a distorted picture of the importance of
individual assets and its change in time, at least when, as in the case of
table 2.2, the share of "net current liabilities" has almost tripled early in
the period. I note that many of the apparent movements in asset composi-
tion in table 2.2—some of them stressed by the authors—largely dis-
appear when the shares are corrected by excluding "current liabilities."
This holds for the overall trend of net property and much of the trend in
net receivables. Even the large rise and fall in the cash items share is
considerably flattened, though the decline over the postwar period as a
whole remains impressive. This trend may, at least partly, reflect more
efficient cash management induced by higher interest rates and computer
technology. A part of this decline shows up as a rise in the net property
share, but only in the last decade; over the entire period, on the other
hand, this share has changed remarkably little.
Let me now come to the issue of leverage and its behavior during the
recent period of rising inflation. This is an issue that is central both to the
Ciccolo and Baum and the Taggart papers. The former cite Friedman's
statement (1980) as an undisputed fact that since the mid-1960s "non-
financial corporate businesses have become more reliant on debt secur-Ill Changes in the Balance Sheet, 1926-1977
ities in financing their growth" and that the "inflationary environment of
the past 15 years has provided a powerful incentive for those with taxable
incomes to increase their indebtedness." Similarly, Taggart states that
"corporations' use of debt has undeniably increased in the post-World
War II"—although both sets of authors do mention that current leverage
is not out of line—and indeed may be low—in comparison with prewar
and, more particularly, pre-Depression periods.
Now, I completely agree with the authors that all models of rational
behavior, except possibly the recent model of Miller, do suggest that,
under the present structure of the corporate and personal tax system,
inflation gives a strong incentive to increase leverage if management is
concerned with maximizing the market value of the firm and if at the same
time markets behave rationally. In my view, however, markets have not
behaved rationally during the last inflationary decade; they have tended
to underestimate the profitability of levered corporations by failing to
adjust profits adequately for the inflationary premium incorporated in
nominal interest rates (see Modigliani and Richard Cohn 1979). As a
result, levered firms have tended, on the whole, to be undervalued in the
market, and that has counteracted the tax incentives to leverage. I would
not, therefore, be surprised to find that, despite the inflation-induced
increases in the gain, leverage has not appreciably increased over the last
decade. Previous contributions have suggested that the evidence is con-
sistent with this view (see e.g., references in the above paper). What I
would like to argue is that, despite Ciccolo and Baum's statements,
neither their evidence nor Taggart's supports the conclusion that leverage
has significantly increased in the course of the inflation which began in the
mid-1960s.
In the case of both papers, the evidence is of two kinds: stocks and
flows. With respect to stocks, they measure the proportion of total
financing that takes the form of debt, or debt plus preferred stock. With
respect to flows, they examine the share of total sources of funds which
consists of net new issues of debt instruments.
In the case of the stock analysis, one faces the issue of what is the
aggregate amount to be financed against which the outstanding debt
should be compared. As is well known, the three alternative measures
are the book value of assets, the market value of assets as measured by
the market value of the liabilities, and the reproduction costs of assets.
These three measures would coincide in an ideal world of no inflation, no
significant technological change, and no significant oligopolistic profits.
Taggart actually gives all three measures even though the book value
measure is, in my view, totally worthless and misleading in an economy
which has experienced inflation as high, and for as long, as the American
economy. It is certain to underestimate, on the average, the true value of
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and more as inflation increases. It is therefore not surprising, but also
totally uninformative, that when one uses this measure, one finds that the
ratio of debt to the book value of assets has risen during the recent
inflation.
The relevant choice, therefore, is between reproduction cost and mar-
ket valuation. In the long run, of course, these two measures should tend
to coincide—that is, Tobin's q (or at least marginal q) should tend to
unity. But the problem with reproduction cost, aside from the difficulties
of estimating it, lies in the fact that assets may, to some extent, be
obsolete and that, therefore, no one would want to reproduce them—that
is, their true economic value falls below reproduction costs. One might
expect that this true value would tend to be captured by market valua-
tion, and in this sense, the ratio of debt to market valuation may appear to
be the most effective way of measuring leverage. On the other hand, what
we are interested in measuring is leverage policy, or the desired financial
structure which, one hopes, is only changing slowly over time. It is
questionable that this desired structure can be reflected adequately in the
ratio of debt to market valuation, which is swayed by the volatile market
valuation of equity. On the other hand, the ratio of debt to reproduction
cost should provide relevant information on leverage policy in the sense
that current financial decisions must bear on the composition of funds
needed to finance the current acquisition of assets which, clearly, must be
at (re)production cost. So, insofar as firms do tend to have a consistent
and stable policy with respect to financing of assets, then that ought to be
reflected in the balance sheet at reproduction cost. To be sure, the
reproduction cost measure will also be subject to a certain noise. But
there is no reason to suppose that it will be systematically biased as a
measure of target leverage—at least when this measure is more stable
than the ratio based on market value.
Ciccolo and Baum's data are set forth in table 2.5, which gives the
ratios of debt preferred and common stock at market value to the repro-
duction cost of net assets. The first impression that one may gather from
this table (which is reinforced by the authors' comments) is that the debt
ratio rose steadily from a low point in 1935 up to 1965—more than
doubling—and that, since 1965, it has risen further, by another third, in
the course of the recent inflation, to reach a peak in 1976-77'.
One must first note that there are many features of their table that
appear quite puzzling. One is the behavior of Tobin's q given in column 4.
It would appear that the ratio of market value to reproduction cost was
higher in both 1930 and 1935 than it was in 1926 and 1927, as well as in just
about every other year except 1965 and marginally in 1959. Another
puzzle is that the debt ratio in column 1 is a good deal lower, at least
through 1959, than is suggested by other data, such as those reported by
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amazingly high, at least until 1953. On the whole, the sum of debt and
preferred appears to behave more reasonably than either of its compo-
nents and also is a good deal more stable. But, even if one confines
oneself to the behavior of the debt ratio, one can see, by comparing table
2.4 and figure 2.3, that the systematic rise in leverage, beginning with
1965, which is exhibited in the first column of table 2.4, is largely the
result of the doubtful procedure adopted in splicing together overlapping
samples. Specifically, the higher ratio reported for 1971 and 1976-77 over
1965 reflects the shift in 1971 to a new sample which had a larger debt
ratio (as well as a very much larger preferred stock ratio). To be sure, the
1965 sample does indicate a modest rise in leverage until 1971. But then
the 1971 sample shows a roughly equal decrease between 1971 and 1977.
For the sum of preferred and debt, the stability of the share is even
greater; it was roughly the same at the end of the period as it was in 1965
on the basis of the 1959 sample. On the whole, there does seem to be a
substantial rise in leverage between the war period and 1965, that is,
during the period of relative price stability. This rise could be accounted
for by a gradual return toward the pre-Depression target leverage which
had been greatly reduced by the fiscal and financial policies of the war
period. But, from that time on, there is no more systematic growth in
leverage through 1976. This picture is supported by Taggart's data on the
ratio of debt to assets at replacement cost reported in his table 1.3. The
figures of columns 2 and 3 show that the debt ratio did rise somewhat from
the low point at the end of the war through the 1950s and the first half of
the 1960s. To be sure, his data do show a rise in the last 2 years, but, since
that estimate comes from another source which is available for just 2
years, I would hesitate to make much of this small rise.
The picture is rather different if we look at the ratio of debt to market
value. Taggart's estimates in table 1.2 reveal a rather substantial rise from
1965 through the late 1970s, especially if for the First War period one
relies on the von Furstenberg's estimates in columns 2 and 3. Similar
results were reported by Ciccolo and Baum in a table which has been
dropped from the final version.
However, as pointed out earlier, the ratio of debt to the market value
of the firm can not be regarded as a reliable measure of target leverage
because it is largely swayed by movements in the market value of equity.
This is particularly true for the more recent period since 1965. In particu-
lar, comparing the leverage measured at market value with the leverage
measured at production cost suggests that the rise in the market value
measure reflects to a large extent the depressing effect of inflation on the
stock market, which by now is well documented, even if there still may be
some disagreement as to the best way of explaining it.
When one comes to the evidence provided by the source of fund flows,
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roughly a doubling, in the ratio of total debt to total sources from the war
years to the 1950s, and another 50% rise from the 1950s to 1970s. Ciccolo
and Baum's figures in table 2.4 also show a very substantial rise in net
issues of debt, at least since the mid-1960s. But I was amazed to discover
that both sets of figures are meaningless because they are not adjusted for
inflation. We know, in fact, that with rational markets (and nondistorting
taxes) Fisher's law holds, increasing the interest bill by pD. Hence, the
after-interest cash flow goes down by pD, which amount, in turn, repre-
sents a compensation to lenders, because the real debt decreases to that
extent. Thus, in order to maintain the initial flow of (real) investment,
and dividends, and an unchanged real debt and leverage, firms have to
increase their debt by pD more than without inflation. Or, equivalently,
to find out whether leverage is changing, one has to adjust the change in
nominal debt by subtracting pD, which amount must, at the same time,
be added back to measured gross internal funds, because true profits, and
hence retained profits, are underestimated by pD. (The same result
should roughly hold, even under the current [distorting] American tax
system, except that Fisher's law has to be replaced by a generalization
sometimes labeled "Super Fisher's" law).
The size of the bias in relative share of debt financing generated by
failure to make the proper inflation corection depends on the rate of
inflation, the size of leverage, and the rate of real growth. While I have
not attempted to make that correction, rough calculation sugests that
both for Taggart and for Ciccolo and Baum, much of the apparent growth
in the share of debt financing since 1965 would disappear with the proper
adjustment.
I conclude, therefore, that there is no convincing evidence that target
leverage has changed appreciably since the beginning of inflation in the
second half of the 1960s, even though most theories would suggest that
inflation does increase the tax avoidance benefits that can be reaped from
leverage. As I suggested earlier, one possible explanation for the discrep-
ancy between what one should expect and what happened could be
inflation fallacies, in the guise of confusion between nominal and real
interest rates. To be sure, Miller's model could also be consistent with
this evidence since, in that model, leverage would presumably have no
value, in equilibrium, independently of the rate of inflation. But I find
that model unacceptable in terms of explaining observed facts. For, if the
total market value of firms were, in fact, independent of leverage, then
investors in low tax brackets would have an advantage in acquiring more
levered firms and unlevering them on personal account, which is inconsis-
tent with the value of firms being unaffected by leverage.
It is less clear how Taggart's eclectic model would be affected by
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the current tax structure, a rise in inflation should produce some increase
in demand and, hence, presumably, induce a higher supply of leverage.
Let me finally conclude by noting that the empirical data on the
behavior of financial structure of both the Ciccolo and Baum and Taggart
papers are taken entirely from the history of the U.S. corporate sector.
There is, however, another set of data which could be very useful in
assessing the explanatory power of alternative theories. It consists of data
bearing on the financial structure prevailing in other industrial countries.
Anyone who has had an opportunity to look at the experience of foreign
countries cannot fail to be impressed by the fact that, almost everywhere
in the rest of the world, leverage is far greater than in this country, and is
frequently of a size that would be considered here absolutely unsound, no
matter what kind of firm one is dealing with. The only exception I know is
Canada, presumably because of the contagion from the United States.
But high leverage seems to prevail in most of Europe, from France and
Italy to Germany, England, Sweden, and the other Scandinavian coun-
tries, and it probably is even greater in the case of Japan. These countries
differ from each other and from the United States in many important
ways, such as in terms of the structure of taxes, the structure of interme-
diation, the nature of the relation between banks and industry, and also
in the structure of wealth holding, and perhaps in its concentration; also,
in attitudes toward risk, and in the extent of credence placed on informa-
tion provided by corporate accounting. It would be fascinating to see
which, if any, of the models which have been developed to account for
leverage in the United States could explain differences between coun-
tries.
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